FTT

FTX Token

South Korean prosecutors demanded 20 years in prison for Delio CEO Jeong Sang-ho. Embezzlement claim of 250 billion won in the scandal linked to the FTX collapse. The court will decide on July 16. ...

South Korean prosecutors demanded 20 years in prison for Delio CEO Jeong Sang-ho. In the scandal stemming from the FTX collapse, 2.800 victims, 250 billion won in damage. FTT price declining at $0....

US Judge Lewis Kaplan found Sam Bankman-Fried's FTX solvency claim 'baseless'. Details on SBF's 25-year prison sentence and FTX fraud. FTT price in downtrend at $0.29; critical supports at $0.2858....

Judge Lewis Kaplan rejected Sam Bankman-Fried's request for new evidence to prove FTX's solvency as 'baseless.' The defense arguments were found insufficient. FTT price $0.29, in a bearish trend. T...

Some traders describe the move as a “dead cat bounce,” a short-lived recovery after a steep decline that often precedes further downside rather than a sustained reversal.

After a month marked by declines, the cryptocurrency market will witness significant events in numerous altcoins in the new week. Continue Reading: These Developments in Altcoins Must Be Closely Monitored This Week

BitcoinWorld Binance Coin (BNB) Price Prediction 2026-2030: Can BNB Realistically Reach $2000? Binance Coin (BNB) continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience in the cryptocurrency market, prompting analysts to examine its potential trajectory through 2030. As the native token ...

FTX and its Recovery Trust have set March 31, 2026, as the start date for the fourth distribution to creditors, with approximately $2.2 billion slated to be paid to eligible claimants. FTX Details Payment Timeline Distributions under the plan began in February 2025, with the inaugural round targeting Convenience Class claimants with claims under $50,000, resulting in around $1.2 billion. The second round, held in May of the same year, saw the first big payouts to larger and institutional creditors, with recovery percentages ranging from 54% to 72%. The third distribution, beginning in September 2025, allocated around $1.6 billion to creditors. For the exchange’s fourth distribution , eligible creditors should receive funds from whichever distribution service provider they previously selected — BitGo, Kraken, or Payoneer — within one to three business days after the distribution date. Separately, consistent with the Plan and the Preferred Shareholder Agreement, FTX set April 30, 2026, as the record date for a payment to preferred equity holders, which is scheduled for May 29, 2026. US Customer Entitlements Reach Full Recovery The allocation for the fourth distribution follows the FTX’s established waterfall priorities. Under those terms, Allowed Class 5A Dotcom Customer Entitlement Claims will receive an incremental 18% distribution, bringing their cumulative recovery to 96% to date. Allowed Class 5B US Customer Entitlement Claims are slated for a 5% distribution, which will complete a 100% cumulative recovery. Both Allowed Class 6A General Unsecured Claims and 6B Digital Asset Loan Claims will receive 15% distributions, likewise reaching 100% cumulatively. Allowed Class 7 Convenience Claims will see a cumulative distribution totaling 120%. The exchange’s native token, FTT, was trading at $0.28 at the time of writing, representing a nearly 8% loss in the previous 24 hours, according to CoinGecko data . Featured image from OpenArt, chart from TradingView.com

BitcoinWorld FTX Collapse: SBF’s Shocking Claim of Spot Trade Liquidity Resurfaces Old Wounds In a development that has reignited debate within the cryptocurrency community, incarcerated FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried has made a startling claim about the exchange’s final hours, asserting it maintained sufficient liquidity to cover all spot trades at the moment of its catastrophic collapse on November 11, 2022. This assertion, communicated via the social media platform X through an intermediary, directly challenges the prevailing narrative of FTX’s instantaneous liquidity crisis and adds a new layer of complexity to the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings and regulatory investigations. The claim forces a re-examination of the exchange’s internal financial mechanics during its death spiral, particularly the relationship between its spot trading operations and its more leveraged products. FTX Collapse: Deconstructing SBF’s Liquidity Claim Sam Bankman-Fried’s recent statement presents a specific and technical argument about the nature of FTX’s insolvency. He contends that the platform held enough liquid assets to satisfy all customer requests for spot withdrawals—the simple buying and selling of cryptocurrencies for immediate delivery. However, he immediately qualifies this by noting that a significant majority of assets were not sitting idle but were actively deployed within margin and lending programs. These programs, according to his explanation, allowed users—including the affiliated trading firm Alameda Research—to engage in margin trading by tapping into a shared collateral pool. Consequently, SBF argues that while spot liabilities were technically coverable, the overall structure was not “100% liquid,” a condition he claims is impossible for any exchange offering leveraged products. This distinction between theoretical spot liquidity and operational illiquidity due to intermingled funds lies at the heart of his defense and the prosecution’s fraud case. Financial experts analyzing this claim highlight several critical points. First, the assertion hinges on a narrow definition of “spot trades,” isolating them from the broader ecosystem of liabilities. Second, the admission that assets were funneled into a shared pool for Alameda’s use corroborates previous allegations of commingled funds. Third, the argument that no margin-enabled exchange is fully liquid is technically accurate but sidesteps the scale of the shortfall at FTX. The exchange’s bankruptcy filings revealed a deficit exceeding $8 billion between customer liabilities and available assets, a gap far beyond normal operational buffers. This context transforms SBF’s statement from a mere technical clarification into a potentially significant legal point regarding intent and mismanagement. The Timeline and Context of the November 2022 Implosion To fully assess this new claim, one must revisit the frantic sequence of events in early November 2022. The crisis began on November 2, when CoinDesk published a report revealing that much of Alameda Research’s balance sheet consisted of FTX’s proprietary token, FTT. This report triggered widespread concern about the financial entanglement between the two entities. Subsequently, on November 6, Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao announced his exchange would liquidate its substantial FTT holdings, precipitating a classic bank run on FTX. Over the next four days, customers attempted to withdraw approximately $6 billion from the platform, overwhelming its systems and exposing its inability to meet these obligations. By November 11, FTX, along with Alameda and over 130 affiliated entities, had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware. The bankruptcy administrators, led by CEO John J. Ray III, have since described the corporate governance at FTX as a complete failure. They found no reliable financial records, inadequate cybersecurity, and a stunning lack of corporate controls. Ray’s team has consistently framed the collapse as a result of a “complete absence of trustworthy financial information” and the misuse of customer funds. SBF’s new claim about spot liquidity exists in direct tension with this official narrative, suggesting a more nuanced—though not necessarily exculpatory—picture of the exchange’s final days. It implies that the insolvency may have been driven more by a crisis of confidence and a run on leveraged positions than by a pure absence of assets for basic spot redemptions. Expert Analysis: Liquidity Versus Solvency Financial and legal professionals emphasize the crucial distinction between liquidity and solvency, a difference that is central to understanding SBF’s statement. Liquidity refers to the ability to meet short-term obligations with available cash or cash-equivalent assets. Solvency , conversely, refers to whether an entity’s total assets exceed its total liabilities. An entity can be solvent but illiquid (unable to access assets quickly to pay debts) or liquid but insolvent (has cash but owes more than it owns). The Core Argument: SBF’s claim suggests FTX may have faced a severe liquidity crunch—its assets were locked in loans and margin positions—rather than outright insolvency at the exact moment of the collapse. However, the subsequent bankruptcy revealed profound insolvency. The Legal Ramification: Prosecutors successfully argued that the commingling of funds and misuse of customer deposits for risky ventures constituted fraud. The liquidity argument does not address the fundamental breach of trust in using customer assets for purposes other than their intended safekeeping. The Industry Norm: While it is true that exchanges engaging in lending are never 100% liquid, industry best practice involves maintaining substantial reserves and clear segregation between customer funds and operational capital, standards FTX demonstrably failed to meet. This expert perspective clarifies that even if the narrow spot-liquidity claim holds a grain of truth, it does not absolve FTX’s leadership of the catastrophic risk management and fiduciary failures that doomed the exchange. The claim instead reframes the mechanism of the collapse, not its fundamental causes. The Impact on Creditors and the Bankruptcy Process The ongoing bankruptcy proceedings aim to recover and redistribute assets to FTX’s millions of creditors worldwide. SBF’s assertion, while unlikely to alter the legal outcome of his conviction, could influence certain creditor negotiations and public perception. The bankruptcy estate, under John Ray, has made significant progress in recovering assets, including through the liquidation of crypto holdings and settlements with various parties. The estate’s current plan proposes repaying creditors based on the value of their assets in November 2022, a point in time that SBF’s statement now indirectly addresses. If his claim were to be interpreted as suggesting more value was theoretically accessible at the moment of collapse, it could fuel discontent among creditors hoping for a higher recovery rate. However, legal analysts note that the practical reality of the bankruptcy—driven by the actual assets recovered, not theoretical snapshots—remains unchanged. The statement’s primary impact is therefore rhetorical, serving to shape the historical narrative of the collapse rather than its financial resolution. It also ensures the FTX saga remains in public discourse, potentially affecting regulatory momentum and investor psychology in the broader crypto market. Conclusion Sam Bankman-Fried’s claim regarding FTX’s spot trade liquidity during its collapse adds a contentious postscript to one of the largest financial failures in cryptocurrency history. While the statement introduces a technical argument about the exchange’s operational state, it does not contradict the established findings of massive fraud, gross mismanagement, and the violation of core fiduciary duties. The FTX collapse serves as a stark, enduring lesson on the perils of opaque financial structures, the absence of regulatory oversight, and the catastrophic consequences of commingling customer funds. As the bankruptcy process continues and the industry evolves, this latest claim ensures that the complex story of the FTX collapse, and the questions it raises about exchange liquidity and solvency, will remain a critical reference point for years to come. FAQs Q1: What exactly is Sam Bankman-Fried claiming about FTX’s liquidity? He claims that at the precise moment of FTX’s bankruptcy filing on November 11, 2022, the exchange held enough liquid assets to cover all customer spot trades. He clarifies that most assets were tied up in margin and lending programs, making the overall system illiquid but suggesting the core spot trading book was theoretically covered. Q2: Does SBF’s claim mean FTX was not insolvent? No. The claim addresses a specific type of liquidity (for spot trades) at a specific moment. The subsequent bankruptcy proceedings revealed FTX was profoundly insolvent, with a multi-billion dollar gap between its assets and liabilities. Liquidity and solvency are different financial concepts. Q3: How is SBF communicating from prison? According to reports, he is posting statements on the social media platform X through an acquaintance or intermediary who has access to his account. All communications are subject to monitoring by prison authorities. Q4: Could this claim affect the bankruptcy repayments to FTX customers? It is highly unlikely to change the practical outcome. The bankruptcy estate’s repayment plan is based on the actual assets recovered by the administration team, not on theoretical claims about liquidity at a past snapshot in time. The legal process is governed by filed claims and recovered funds. Q5: What is the difference between spot trading and margin trading on an exchange? Spot trading involves the immediate purchase or sale of a cryptocurrency for immediate settlement. Margin trading allows users to borrow funds (leverage) to trade larger positions than their capital would allow, using existing assets as collateral. SBF’s claim centers on assets being used to back these margin loans instead of being held for spot redemptions. This post FTX Collapse: SBF’s Shocking Claim of Spot Trade Liquidity Resurfaces Old Wounds first appeared on BitcoinWorld .