$WULF Morgan Stanley note...
We think the Powered Shell Provider (PSP) stocks offer, on average, very attractive risk-reward skews, with underlying, high quality value not reflected in current valuations. We address what we view as the biggest misconceptions around the names. Overweight $HUT, WULF, $RIOT, $GLXY, and $CIFR.
Key takeaways
PSP stocks performed poorly over the last several months, driven by a combination of concerns and what we see as misconceptions on the cohort.
Misconception
#1: PSPs are neoclouds. PSPs are effectively landlords with highly attractive, long-term leases — no chip-related risks.
Misconception
#2: PSPs will struggle to finance growth. Given expected contracts, we are confident in their ability to finance attractive growth.
Misconception
#3: PSPs are speculative, with little visibility to capital return. We see 2027 as a year of surprising asset monetization and dividends.
Misconception
#4: higher debt costs undermine IRRs. Debt costs rose by ~200bp following higher rates/spreads. However, project yields rose more (300-400 bps).
There is significant confusion about the value proposition for Powered Shell Provider (PSP) stocks, so much so that we believe it is helpful to focus on the fundamentals of these stocks. In this short note, we walk through what we see as the biggest misconceptions around the names and the math driving our bullish view on PSPs.
Misconception
#1: PSPs are often confused with neoclouds. PSPs are fundamentally different from neoclouds: (i) PSPs enter into 15- to 20-year leases, rather than 2-3 years for neoclouds; (ii) powered shells built by PSPs are less capital-intensive ($9-14/watt, rather than $30-50/watt for the neoclouds); and (iii) PSPs take no chip risk — PSPs are simply landlords. We believe it is instructive to compare PSP stocks with real estate stocks. Many real estate investors use discount rates and cap rates that are much lower than those embedded in PSP valuations. For example, in our base case for WULF (441% upside to our price target), we use a 9% equity discount rate and 7% terminal cap rate on contracts that we expect the company to sign over the next few years.
Misconception
#2: PSPs will struggle to finance growth. Because PSPs have long-term contracts with some of the strongest credits in the world (with a few exceptions — note that our Overweights skew heavily toward very high customer credit quality), we think their ability to finance growth is much stronger than appreciated. For example, for a project with a long-term lease with Amazon, CIFR was able to raise debt at a 98% Loan-to-Cost (PTC). In a recent note, we described the contracts that we expect the PSPs to sign this fall and winter: 20-year duration, 19% average yield on cost, with very strong (AA) credit support for lease payments. At those terms, we would expect equity needs to be minimal to zero. In addition, many PSPs control assets that they could partially monetize, which would provide a double benefit: crystallizing the value of their assets at a high $/watt (many multiples of where the stocks trade) and eliminating the "equity issuance overhang." Here is an example: WULF intends to monetize 168 MW coming online before year-end. If, in 2027, WULF entered into an 800 critical IT MW lease at its Muskie site (assuming a 1.25 PUE), the company could in our view easily support any equity contribution requirements. For example, if Muskie total capex were $8.0-8.8 billion ($10-11/watt), and equity needs were 10-15% of this amount (we view this as conservative), then equity needs would be $800m to $1.32b. Here is the indicative asset sale math: 168 MW, year 1 EBITDA of ~$220m ($10/watt cost * year one EBITDA yield of 13%), gross proceeds of $3.3 billion at an indicative EV/EBITDA of 15x (this crystallizes the asset value of $19.60/watt — WULF stock trades at an EV/watt of $2.50), and net pretax proceeds (net of capex) of $1.6 billion, well in excess of the equity needs for Muskie. It is also important to note that the aforementioned 168MW represents 20% of all contracted MWs and 5.7% of all controlled (owned plus leased) MWs in WULF's portfolio.
Misconception
#3: PSPs are speculative, with little prospect of capital return. PSPs are engaged in a fundamental transformation, turning themselves into real estate companies with highly visible, high quality, long duration cash flows. We are bullish that we will begin to see corporate action to effect capital return to shareholders in 2027. For example, for each of the 168 MW modules coming online soon (one before YE 2026, one in 1Q27), we project Net Operating Income of ~$225mn. If 50% of this NOI were used to fund a dividend, the amount would be $112.5, implying a 1.5% yield on the stock (assuming our calculation of approximately 616mn fully diluted shares outstanding and a 10/20 closing price of $12.01).
Misconception
#4: Higher debt funding costs will significantly hurt returns. We addressed the higher interest rate environment in our recent PSP note New 20/19/18 Framework,where we also modified our expectations of valuations. Higher interest rates and wider credit spreads increase the discount rates that we use in valuing stocks, and this is especially important for PSPs given the magnitude of upcoming debt financings required to execute on these companies' growth plans. For example, for our valuation of CIFR, a 100 bps increase in our equity discount rate would reduce our price target by $6.00, or 12.0% of our current price target of $50.
We see a clear catalyst path to addressing these concerns over the next several months. Key milestones include (i) elections in early November; (ii) final Batch 0 base load certification for Texas in December; and (iii) additional neocloud tenant disclosures from November through February, providing greater visibility into customer credit quality. We also expect a few lease deals over the next month, including RIOT’s Corsicana and potential APLD lease expansions, which they addressed in their recent earnings report. WULF’s Muskie is another potential near-term signing, although timing may extend into 1Q27 given the size of the site. New leases should provide direct evidence of the long-duration contracts, attractive project economics, and strong credit support that underpin our confidence in PSPs’ ability to finance growth and our updated 20/19/18 framework.
We see two additional important mitigants: 1) based on a sensitivity analysis from our credit colleagues, returns are more sensitive to the lease economics — such as starting revenue/MW, lease term, annual escalators, margins - and construction cost and timeline than they are to financing inputs such as cost of debt and DSCR; 2) for these factors that matter the most for returns, there is negotiating leverage in future transactions. From Summer 2025 to the present, PSP lease rates have increased from ~$1.80/critical IT watt (the WULF August 2025 transaction was at $1.83/watt) to $2.30-2.40/watt (WULF in July 2026 at $2.37/watt, RIOT in August 2026 at $2.38/watt). We expect to see upcoming lease transactions at average yields on cost (over the life of the lease) at 100 bps above historical average levels; such a higher yield would increase the value creation per watt by ~$3.50, more than offsetting a 100 bps increase in debt funding costs.
When it comes to financing costs, increasingly though, we think there are two dynamics to monitor: 1) higher treasury yields (see Exhibit 1), with 5Y UST up ~135bp in the last 12 months — issuers can't control such types of moves which are tied to macro-economic developments. Persistent rates volatility can dampen demand for the HY market — which has been the primary source of debt funding for PSPs — and sentiment can weigh on spreads; 2) wider credit spreads — this is the deal-specific/idiosyncratic aspect of financing costs, and we see credit spreads for PSP debt as a combination of tenant's credit quality (in some cases a result of HQ credit support), construction risk, and deal structure (initial leverage based on LTC and percentage of principal amortization through the life of the lease).
Among those, we expect construction risk to continue to drive spread volatility in secondary trading given headlines around delays (either on power or just regular construction). However, we think tenant quality and deal structure are two factors that can be calibrated in response to the current environment, and would facilitate better and more seamless access to the credit markets. As seen in Exhibit 3, credit spreads for deals with HQ hyperscalers (either as direct tenants or providing backstops/guarantees) are ~175bp lower than credit spreads for deals with neoclouds/other tenants; we also note that this gap was initially wider (4Q25), narrowed in 2Q26 when we got most of the supply in the HY market, and started to widen again in 3Q26.
5Y UST yields are ~135bp higher vs. October 2025
All-in yields for HY PSP bonds is now >9%
Credit spreads at issuance for different tenant groups
The widening in BB bonds hasn't been limited to data center bonds
We encourage investors to take this opportunity to do further diligence on the PSPs — we view this as an opportunity to own stocks with underlying, high quality value not reflected in current valuations.
We View Current Underperformance as a Buying opportunity.
Projects with higher quality tenants and/or add'l credit support tend to benefit from lower financing costs vs. projects with lower-rated tenants